Issue 3, 2007

Dorofeev E. A. Russian Oil Corporations Insider Stock Valuation: Post-Crisis Period Analysed

Based on the so-called non-marketable assets approach, the paper deals with one of the most interesting and popular problems in the modern corporate governance theory — the problem of valuation of the corporate control and related topics of insider asset valuation and risk aversion. The author proves that they evaluate the unity of the marketable portion of corporate assets lower than corporate outsiders do, and they pay less attention to the asset-related marketable risk. The author shows that, in 2004–2005, the Russia’s largest oil corporations’ management (dominated stockholders) evaluated the market risk much less crucial than outside corporate investors did. The formers’ unity risk premium appears lower than that of latters. Nevertheless, both dominant and minor stockholders’ portfolios brought similar total returns, the latter being a condition for absence of corporate conflicts in Russian oil business of 2004–2005.

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