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RUSSIAN
Published since 2002
Frequency: 4 issues per year
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Issue 3, 2014

Ivanov A. E. Modeling of Quasi-Corrupt Behavior in Public Procurement.

The paper makes a contribution to the development of the public sector agency models. Until now, the researchers efforts were mostly concentrated on the development of the models of bureaucratic and efficient corruption. The paper completes the construction of the typology of agency models, having introduced into consideration a model of quasi-corruption based on assumptions of mala fides of the Principal and bona fides of the Agent. The model is applied to examine public procurement issue connected with the declining competition in the e-auctions in Russian Federation. Having compared the e-auctions performance and the corruption level in RF, the paper hypothesizes that competition may be limited by both the mala fide and bona fide public buyer: the first seeks to obtain bribes, the second tries to achieve benevolent goals. The paper has identified incentives of a bona fide public buyer to restrict competition and proposed relevant amendments to the legislation of the Russian Federation on public procurement, eliminating the need for such behavior. Keywords: public procurement, the principal agent model, corruption, quasi-corruption, auction

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Released: Issue 2, 2017
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